

Tenth Edition

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Domestic Responses
to Global Challenges



Charles Hauss

FIGURE 1.1 State, Society, and Global Forces




FIGURE 1.2 New Innovations over Time





FIGURE 2.1 The Political System



TWO BY TWO		
Factors Affecting the Development of States		
	INTERNATIONAL	DOMESTIC
Historical	Imperialism	State and nation building
Contemporary	Globalization and the end of the Cold War	Pressures from people and the groups they form

Tenth Edition

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Domestic Responses
to Global Challenges

Charles Hauss
Alliance for Peacebuilding



Australia • Brazil • Mexico • Singapore • United Kingdom • United States

This is an electronic version of the print textbook. Due to electronic rights restrictions, some third party content may be suppressed. Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. The publisher reserves the right to remove content from this title at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it. For valuable information on pricing, previous editions, changes to current editions, and alternate formats, please visit www.cengage.com/highered to search by ISBN#, author, title, or keyword for materials in your areas of interest.

Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product text may not be available in the eBook version.

Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges, Tenth Edition
Charles Hauss

Product Manager: Brad Potthoff

Project Manager: Julia Giannotti

Content Developer: Shannon Stanton,
Lumina Datamatics

Product Assistant: Danielle Gidley

Marketing Manager: Valerie Hartman

Content Project Manager: Corinna Dibble

Manufacturing Planner: Julio Esperas

IP Analyst: Alexandra Ricciardi

IP Project Manager: Betsy Hathaway

Production Service and Compositor:
Lumina Datamatics

Art Director: Sarah Cole

Text and Cover Designer: Liz Harasymczuk

Cover Image:

Evgenii Bobrov/Shutterstock.com

Kenishrotie/Shutterstock.com

kentoh/Shutterstock.com

iStockPhoto.com/bluejayphoto

iStockPhoto.com/hadynyah

iStockPhoto.com/RoterPanther

© 2019, 2015, 2013 Cengage Learning, Inc.

All items are copyright of Cengage unless otherwise noted

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this work covered by the copyright herein may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, except as permitted by U.S. copyright law, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.

For product information and technology assistance, contact us at
Cengage Customer & Sales Support, 1-800-354-9706.

For permission to use material from this text or product,
submit all requests online at www.cengage.com/permissions.

Further permissions questions can be emailed to
permissionrequest@cengage.com.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017950102

Student Edition:
ISBN: 978-1-337-55480-0

Loose-leaf Edition:
ISBN: 978-1-337-55485-5

Cengage
20 Channel Street
Boston, MA 02210
USA

Cengage is a leading provider of customized learning solutions with employees residing in nearly 40 different countries and sales in more than 125 countries around the world. Find your local representative at www.cengage.com.

Cengage products are represented in Canada by Nelson Education, Ltd.

To learn more about Cengage platforms and services, visit www.cengage.com.

To register or access your online learning solution or purchase materials for your course, visit www.cengagebrain.com.

Brief Contents

CHAPTER 1	Global Challenges	2
CHAPTER 2	Domestic Responses	22
CHAPTER 3	The Industrialized Democracies	36
CHAPTER 4	The United States	60
CHAPTER 5	The United Kingdom	83
CHAPTER 6	Germany	116
CHAPTER 7	Current and Former Communist Regimes	148
CHAPTER 8	Russia	169
CHAPTER 9	China	204
CHAPTER 10	The Global South	240
CHAPTER 11	India	273
CHAPTER 12	Iran	307
CHAPTER 13	Nigeria	339
CHAPTER 14	Mexico	374
CHAPTER 15	The World Is Messed Up: Discuss	410
CHAPTER 16	The European Union	422
CHAPTER 17	Toward a Paradigm Shift	447

Contents

Preface	xi
Additional Supplements for Instructors	xiii
Acknowledgments	xiv

PART 1

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

Global Challenges 2

A Not So Simple Exercise	4
<i>Of What Is This an Instance?</i>	5
<i>What Are Its Causes?</i>	5
<i>How Does What Happens Over There Matter Over Here?</i>	5
<i>Cleaning Up Your Wall</i>	6
From Global Challenges to Wicked Problems	6
<i>Globalization and Global Challenges</i>	6
<i>Two Dates and One Year</i>	7
VUCA	8
<i>Change Is the Only Constant</i>	9
<i>An Entangled World</i>	10
<i>Wicked Problems</i>	11
Global Patterns/Global Challenges	12
Core Concepts in Comparative Politics	14
<i>History and Culture</i>	14
<i>Pressures from Below</i>	15
<i>The State, Politics, and Power</i>	16
<i>Public Policy</i>	16
<i>Feedback</i>	17

Where We Go from Here	17
<i>The Industrialized Democracies</i>	17
<i>The Current and Former Communist Regimes</i>	17
<i>The Global South</i>	18
<i>The Future of Comparative Politics</i>	18
Using This Book	18
<i>Controversy and Bias</i>	19
<i>Using charleshauss.info</i>	19
<i>Boxes, Footnotes, and the Like</i>	20

CHAPTER 2

Domestic Responses 22

Politics and Science	23
<i>Politics</i>	24
<i>Science</i>	24
<i>Comparison</i>	26
The Political System	27
<i>The State</i>	27
<i>Inputs</i>	29
<i>Outputs</i>	30
<i>Feedback</i>	30
<i>The Environment</i>	31
System Dynamics and Complexity	31
<i>System Dynamics</i>	31
<i>Complexity and Wicked Problems</i>	32
One Final Template	32

PART 2

INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES

CHAPTER 3

The Industrialized Democracies 36

Was Churchill Right?	37
The Context	39
<i>Defining Democracy</i>	39
<i>Which Countries Are Democratic?</i>	41
The Evolution of the Democratic State	41
<i>The Origins of Democratic Thought</i>	42
<i>Four Crises</i>	43
Political Culture	45
Political Participation	46
<i>Left and Right</i>	46
<i>From Catch-All Parties to the New Populism</i>	47
<i>Making Sense of the Changes</i>	50
The Democratic State	51
<i>Presidential and Parliamentary Systems</i>	52
<i>The Rest of the State</i>	54
<i>The Courts: The Forgotten Branch?</i>	55
Public Policy	55
<i>The Interventionist State</i>	55
<i>Foreign Policy</i>	57
Churchill Revisited	57

CHAPTER 4

The United States 60

It's Even Worse than It Looks	61
The Context: American Exceptionalism?	63
The Evolution of the United States	64
<i>Creating the Constitutional Order</i>	64
<i>After the Framers</i>	66
<i>Modern American Politics</i>	66
The American Political Culture	67
Political Participation	69
<i>A Two-Party System?</i>	69
<i>The Democrats</i>	70

<i>The Republicans</i>	70
<i>Common Trends</i>	72
<i>American Distinctiveness</i>	74
The Weak American State	74
<i>The Legislative Process</i>	75
<i>The Rest of the Weak State</i>	78
Public Policy	79
<i>Domestic Issues</i>	79
<i>Foreign Policy</i>	80
Wicked Problems and Kluges	81

CHAPTER 5

The United Kingdom 83

Confusion?	84
The Context	86
<i>Geography</i>	86
<i>Religion</i>	86
<i>Social Class</i>	87
<i>Race and Immigration</i>	87
<i>(Relative) Economic Decline</i>	87
The Evolution of the British State	88
<i>The Broad Sweep of British History</i>	88
<i>The Collectivist Years</i>	91
<i>Thatcher, Blair, and Their Legacies</i>	92
British Political Culture	94
<i>The Civic Culture Holds—Sort Of</i>	94
<i>Erosion of Class</i>	95
<i>Will There Always Be a Britain?</i>	95
Political Participation	96
<i>The Conservatives</i>	97
<i>Labour</i>	99
<i>The Liberal Democrats</i>	101
<i>Regional Parties</i>	102
<i>UKIP and the New Populism</i>	102
<i>The British Electorate</i>	103
<i>The Electoral System</i>	104
<i>Interest Groups</i>	105

The British State: Enduring Myths and Changing Realities 105

- The Monarchy and the Lords: Still Dignified?* 106
- Parliamentary Sovereignty and Party Government* 107
- The Rest of the State* 110

Public Policy 110

- Capitalism's Victory: Thatcher, Blair, and Beyond* 111
- Brexit* 112

Confusion Revisited 114

CHAPTER 6 Germany 116

More of the Same? 117

The Context 118

- Wealth* 118
- Diversity* 118
- Decentralization* 119

The Evolution of the German State 119

- Unification and the Kaiser's Reich* 119
- Weimar and the Rise of Hitler* 121
- The Third Reich* 122
- Occupation and the Two Germanys* 123
- Building a Democratic Germany* 124
- Unification and Beyond* 125

Creating a Democratic Political Culture 126

Political Participation 128

- Parties and the Electoral Process* 128
- Interest Groups* 132

The German State: A Smoothly Functioning Democracy 133

- Chancellor Democracy* 134
- The Bundestag* 135
- The Bundesrat and Federalism* 136
- The Civil Service* 137
- The Federal Constitutional Court* 138
- Corporatism* 138

Public Policy 139

- Model Deutschland* 140
- Europe* 144

Meeting Wicked Problems Halfway? 145

PART 3 THE CRISIS OF COMMUNISM

CHAPTER 7 Current and Former Communist Regimes 148

Do We Need Part 3? 149

- A Bit of Nostalgia* 150
- Tough Transitions* 151

The Context 152

- Who to Include* 152
- The Leminist State* 152
- Transitions* 153

Socialism, Marxism, and Leninism 154

- Socialism* 154
- Marxism* 155
- Marxism-Leninism* 156
- Stalinism* 157
- Expansion* 158
- De-Stalinization* 158
- The Mature Party State* 159

Suicide by Public Policy 160

Transitions 162

- Reasonably Stable Democracies* 163
- Hybrid and Authoritarian Regimes* 164
- The Remnants of the Communist World* 166

And What about the Eleventh Edition? 167

CHAPTER 8 Russia 169

What if They Held an Election and You Didn't Notice? 170

The Context 172

- Geography* 172
- Diversity* 172
- Poverty* 172
- Aging* 173

The Evolution of the Russian State 173

- The Broad Sweep of Russian History* 173
- Prelude to Revolution* 174
- Lenin and the (Wrong?) Revolution* 174

<i>Totalitarianism and the Modernization of the Soviet Union</i>	176
<i>Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and the Politics of Decline</i>	177
<i>Soviet Collapse</i>	180
<i>Making the Russian State: From Dictatorship to Democracy and Back Again</i>	183
The Russian State: The Vertical of Power	187
<i>The Presidency</i>	187
<i>The Oligarchs</i>	190
<i>The Bureaucracy</i>	191
<i>The Duma</i>	192
<i>The Federation</i>	192
<i>The Judiciary</i>	192
<i>The Military</i>	193
<i>Corruption</i>	193
Public Policy	193
<i>The Economy</i>	193
<i>Foreign Policy</i>	195
Political Culture	197
Political Participation	198
<i>Political Parties</i>	198
<i>Elections</i>	200
<i>Civil Society</i>	201
Conclusion: Half Empty or Half Full?	202

CHAPTER 9

China 204

This Is Communism?	205
<i>Crocodile Tails and Pet Nannies</i>	205
<i>A New Social Contract?</i>	206
The Context	207
<i>Think Big, Think Crowded</i>	207
<i>Relative Homogeneity</i>	208
<i>Economic Boom and Its Effects</i>	208
<i>But the Stakes Are Still High</i>	208
The Evolution of the Chinese State	208
<i>Deep Roots</i>	209
<i>A Failed Revolution</i>	210
<i>China Stands Up</i>	211
<i>Factionalism</i>	212
<i>Reform</i>	216

The Party State	218
<i>Continuities</i>	218
<i>Leadership</i>	219
<i>Discipline not Democracy</i>	221
<i>Fragmented Authoritarianism</i>	222
<i>Half the Sky?</i>	223
<i>The Future of the Party State?</i>	224
Public Policy: Perestroika without Glasnost'	224
<i>Economic Reform</i>	224
<i>Foreign Policy</i>	228
Political Culture	231
<i>A Blank Slate? A Cultural Revolution?</i>	231
<i>Cultural Politics since the Death of Mao</i>	232
Political Participation	232
<i>Top-Down Participation</i>	232
<i>Sanctioned Voluntary Participation</i>	233
<i>Protest from Below</i>	234
<i>Ani-System Dissent</i>	235
Conclusion: Is Change the Only Constant?	236

PART 4

THE GLOBAL SOUTH

CHAPTER 10

The Global South 240

A Single Slum?	241
The Context	244
<i>What's in a Name?</i>	244
<i>Heightened Stakes/Limited Development</i>	244
<i>Weak, Failed, and Fragile States</i>	248
<i>What Matters Over There Matters Over Here</i>	249
The Evolution of Politics in the Global South	250
<i>Imperialism and Its Legacy</i>	250
<i>Independence</i>	252
<i>Postcolonial Problems</i>	252
Political Culture: The Power of Identity	253
Political Participation	254
<i>Inside the System</i>	254
<i>Civil Society</i>	255

<i>A Different Kind of Feminism</i>	256
<i>The Private Sector</i>	256
<i>Participation, Repression, and Regime Change</i>	256
States—Weak, Failed, Fragile, and Otherwise	257
<i>Democracies</i>	259
<i>Authoritarian Regimes</i>	259
<i>Military Rule</i>	260
<i>Failed and Fragile States</i>	260
Public Policy: Development and Democracy	260
<i>What Is Development</i>	261
<i>From Import Substitution to Structural Adjustment</i>	261
<i>The Politics of Aid and Development</i>	264
<i>New Initiatives</i>	266
<i>The Role of Globalization</i>	269
<i>Democratization?</i>	270
The Ultimate Wicked Problem	271

CHAPTER 11

India 273

Modi and the New India	274
The Context	276
<i>Identity</i>	276
<i>Enduring Poverty and New Wealth</i>	277
<i>Democracy, Political Stability, and Change</i>	279
The Evolution of the Indian State	279
<i>The Mughals and the Impact of Islam</i>	279
<i>British Colonialism</i>	280
<i>The Struggle for Independence</i>	281
<i>The Nehru Years</i>	283
<i>Centralization and Fragmentation under Indira Gandhi</i>	283
<i>Coalition Politics</i>	285
<i>And Modi</i>	286
Political Culture	286
<i>Regime Success</i>	287
<i>Identity Politics</i>	287
<i>Modernization</i>	288
Political Participation	289
<i>Indian Elections</i>	289
<i>The Party System</i>	289

<i>Minor Parties</i>	292
<i>Interest Groups</i>	293
The Indian State	294
<i>The Constitution</i>	294
<i>Parliament</i>	295
<i>Federalism</i>	296
<i>The Bureaucracy and Corruption</i>	297
Public Policy	297
<i>Confronting Communal Violence</i>	297
<i>Stimulating the Economy</i>	301
Conclusion: Democracy in India . . . and Beyond	305

CHAPTER 12

Iran 307

The Weapons Deal	308
The Context	309
<i>What's in a Name?</i>	309
<i>Dual and Dueling Leaderships</i>	310
<i>Shiite and Sunni</i>	310
<i>Social and Economic Conditions</i>	312
<i>The Status of Women</i>	312
The Evolution of the Iranian State	312
<i>Before Islam</i>	313
<i>Islamic Iran</i>	313
<i>The Pahlavis</i>	315
<i>The Islamic Republic</i>	318
Political Culture	322
Political Participation	323
<i>The Ayatollahs' Democracy</i>	323
<i>Two Critical Elections</i>	324
<i>Civil Society: The Women's Movement and Film</i>	327
The Iranian State	329
<i>The Unelected Institutions</i>	330
<i>The Elected Institutions and the Balance of Power</i>	332
Public Policy	333
<i>The Great Satan</i>	333
<i>The Economy</i>	335
Conclusion: Uncertainty	337

CHAPTER 13**Nigeria 339**

The Chibok Girls	340
The Context	341
<i>Abundant Resources</i>	341
<i>Poverty</i>	341
<i>Diversity</i>	343
The Evolution of the Nigerian State	343
<i>Before the British</i>	344
<i>Colonial Rule</i>	345
<i>Independence</i>	347
<i>The First Republic</i>	349
<i>Military Rule I</i>	350
<i>The Second Republic</i>	352
<i>Military Rule II</i>	352
<i>Military Rule III</i>	353
<i>The Fourth Republic</i>	354
Political Culture	355
<i>Core Values</i>	355
<i>Elite Culture</i>	358
Political Participation	358
<i>Political Parties and Elections</i>	359
<i>Beyond Elections</i>	361
The Nigerian State	363
<i>The Government</i>	364
<i>Federalism</i>	365
<i>Corruption and the Personalization of Power</i>	366
<i>The Military</i>	367
Public Policy	367
<i>Democratization</i>	367
<i>Economic Development and Structural Adjustment</i>	369
<i>Social Entrepreneurship</i>	371
Wicked Problems and Vicious Cycles	372

CHAPTER 14**Mexico 374**

They're Baaaaaaack	375
The Context	377
<i>A Country in Transition</i>	377
<i>Diversity</i>	378
<i>Big Brother Is Watching</i>	378

Accelerating Change 379

The Evolution of the Mexican State	379
<i>The Colonial Era</i>	379
<i>Independence</i>	380
<i>The Revolution</i>	381
<i>Institutionalizing the Revolution</i>	382
<i>Cárdenas and His Legacy</i>	382
<i>An Institutional Revolutionary Party</i>	383
<i>The End of an Era</i>	384
Political Culture in Mexico	385
<i>Enduring Norms</i>	385
<i>Subcultures and Cultural Change</i>	386
Political Participation	386
<i>The PRI</i>	387
<i>The PAN</i>	389
<i>The PRD</i>	390
<i>Civil Society</i>	392
The Mexican State	393
<i>Non-Reelection and Presidential Domination</i>	393
<i>Congress and the Legislative Process</i>	395
<i>The Cabinet, the Bureaucracy, and the Judiciary</i>	395
<i>Federalism</i>	396
<i>Corruption</i>	396
<i>Since 2000: Democracy and Its Growing Pains</i>	397
Public Policy	397
<i>Development</i>	397
<i>U.S.-Mexican Relations: Immigration, Drugs, and NAFTA</i>	401
Conclusion: Democracy Interrupted?	407

PART 5**COMPARATIVE POLITICS—
THE NEXT GENERATION****CHAPTER 15****The World Is Messed Up: Discuss 410**

The World Is Messed Up: Discuss	411
SWOT	413
<i>Threats</i>	413
<i>Strengths</i>	413

Weaknesses 414
Opportunities 415
On Paradigms and Paradigm Shifts 416
Scientific Revolutions and Paradigm Shifts 416
Einstein and His One Liners 416
Political Paradigm Shifts: A Failed Example 418
The Adjacent(s) Possible 419
Two Themes 419
Two Ways Forward 420

CHAPTER 16

The European Union 422

Not of Its Own Making 423
On Supranational Governance 425
The Adjacent Possible 425
Functionalism and Cumulative Strategies 425
The Context 426
What Is the EU? 426
Who's In? Who's Out? 426
The Evolution of the European Union 427
Idealism Meets Pragmatism 427
Creating the Common Market 429
Uncertainty 432
Political Culture and Participation in the European Union 434
The European State? 435
The Complexity of EU Decision Making 435
In Lieu of a Constitution: Pillars and Competences 436
The Institutions 436
The EU and National Sovereignty 440

Next Steps? 441
Public Policy in the European Union 442
The Internal Market 442
Monetary Union 443
The Common Agricultural Policy 444
The European Union and Supranational Authority:
The Next Adjacent Possible 445

CHAPTER 17

Toward a Paradigm Shift 447

A Fork in the Road 448
Wicked Problems Revisited 449
Systems Revisited—The Changing Nature of Power 450
System Dynamics 452
Networks and Complexity 453
The Long Haul 454
Toward a New Paradigm 454
Systems and Adaptive Leadership 456
Pie-in-the-Sky Idealism or Paradigm Shift? 457
A Different Kind of Analysis 458
A Different Kind of Action 459
The International Fund for Ireland 460
National Mechanisms for Atrocity Prevention 460
Combating Corruption in Mexico 461
Student and Citizen 461

Glossary 463
Name Index 475
Subject Index 479

Preface

Changes since the Ninth Edition

Although this phrase gets used entirely too much, the tenth edition of *Comparative Politics* has been totally revised. Although I kept the key themes from the first nine editions, this version is qualitatively different.

New General Features

The basic structure of the book remains the same. After experimenting with other organizational schemes, I decided to stay with the one I have always used, the most controversial aspect of which is treating the current and former communist countries together. As I argue in Part 3, they may have little in common today. However, they remained marked enough by their Marxist-Leninist past that it makes them unique among the world's political system.

More importantly, I have spent even more time dealing with the book's subtitle—domestic responses to global challenges. The events that took place in the six months it took me to rewrite the book should help you understand why you can't understand comparative politics without giving just as much attention to its global context. To cite just a few examples. Trump won. The United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. Russians almost certainly hacked the American election. The presidents of Brazil and South Korea were impeached. India made its most popular currency notes illegal.

This edition gets at those kinds of issues in three main ways.

Wicked problems and other new concepts. While I continue to focus on globalization and its implications, I add a few new ideas that I follow throughout the book. None is more important than wicked problems, a term planners use to describe issues whose causes and consequences are so inextricably intertwined that they cannot be solved simply, quickly, or easily—if they can be solved at all.

I make the case that wicked problems define much of political life because globalization involves more than just the “shrinking” of the planet but also includes the emergence of a more networked, interconnected world that is qualitatively different than the one for which most comparative politics concepts were developed. I spin that idea out, for example, by considering the ways in which all political system are having trouble reaching public goods.

As a result, I spend a lot more time on paradigms and paradigm shifts from the beginning of the book onward.

More applied. My editors at Cengage asked me to make the book more engaging by including more insights drawn from my work as a peacebuilder and policy wonk. I have studied, taught, and wrote about comparative politics for 50 years. During most of that time, I have also been a political activist with that other work taking up most of my time for the second half of my career.

I found the process of combining insights from the two halves of my professional life remarkably rewarding. I saw things about comparative politics I would not have seen without my work in peacebuilding and vice versa.

That is part of the reason why I focus as much as I do on paradigms and paradigm shifts. But, it also leads me to consider “outside the box” ideas that are not included in many comparative politics texts but have helped turn many of my students on to the subject over the years.

Integrated website. The printed version of *Comparative Politics* is only one part of an integrated suite of materials my editors and I have developed. Of course, the book has a standard instructor's manual, test bank, and the other ancillaries that are standard in modern textbook publishing.

However, no book of this sort could or should stand on its own in the twenty-first century. Therefore, I have created and maintained a website for this book and my other publishing endeavors—www.charleshauss.info.

The Comparative Politics portion of the site includes:

- *Online chapters* on Canada, France, Japan, South Africa, and Brazil that could not be included in the book for space and cost reasons. They can be downloaded for free.
- *Updates* on the countries. This book was out of date the moment I sent it to my editors. As a result, the website will include regular updates as well as blog posts on breaking news as events warrant.
- *Community*. The website is also designed to help students master the material through study guides that go beyond the boxes that appear at the start of each chapter. There are videos in which I am interviewed by Sarah Federman of the University of Baltimore. The website also allows students to post reactions to points made in the book or in class so that they can learn together with readers using the book at other schools around the world.
- *Feedback*. I like nothing more than getting critical feedback from readers. Earlier editions of *Comparative Politics* always included my email address. The website will make it easier for readers to pose questions to me and, as noted earlier, to others who are using the book.
- *Links*. The text continues to provide links to sources on the Internet. However, those, too, are outdated the day the book goes to press. Moreover, new sites emerge and existing ones disappear. Perhaps most importantly, I'm rarely willing to retype a convoluted URL from a printed page into my browser, something I suspect I share with most of today's students. In other words, every link included in the text and more is clickable on the website.

Specific Changes

The tenth edition is filled with changes to individual chapters that update the material as of late March 2017. In addition, these are the most important changes in each of the book's five parts.

Part 1 now has two chapters that set the substantive and methodological agendas of the field. In addition to the material from earlier editions, this one introduces ideas like wicked problems, complexity science, and paradigm shifts.

Part 2 spends more time on the key developments of the four years since the ninth edition was published—the rise of populism and concerns about inequality. Plenty of attention is given to Trump, Brexit, the European migration crisis, and more as exemplars of those dramatic—and worrisome—changes sweeping the democratic world. The chapter on France has been moved on line to save space in the published book, and the one on the European Union is now in Part 5.

Part 3 continues to focus on the current and former communist regimes. The introductory chapter is the least changed of any in the book. However, the one on Russia explores the implications of Putin's increasingly authoritarian regime in Russia *and* the degree to which it reflects the country's Marxist-Leninist past. The chapter on China continues to explore the tensions between the party state and the country's increasingly capitalist economy but does so in the context of the growing scholarly argument that the two could coexist indefinitely.

Part 4 continues to explore the ways that global forces constrain leaders and citizens alike in the Global South. I spend more time on peacebuilding efforts than I did in earlier editions because that's where most Alliance for Peacebuilding member organizations do more of their work. I also spend more time on progress that has been made in ending poverty in the South in part through the UN adoption of its Sustainable Development Goals and through public-private partnerships that seek to provide public goods that the state cannot or will not achieve.

Part 5 considers the challenges facing comparative politics and has changed the most from the ninth edition to the tenth. It starts with a chapter that explores the kinds of questions that comparative politics as we know it today cannot answer. That's not the case because the tools developed in Part 1 and applied in Parts 2 through 4 no longer have merit. Rather, we need to add to them by considering the implications of wicked problems, paradigm shifts, global challenges, and the like. The other two chapters explore ways such a paradigm shift is already unfolding, first, through an examination of the incremental changes represented by international organizations like the European Union and then by more conscious and intentional efforts to produce a paradigm shift, some of which I have personally been involved in.

Additional Supplements for Instructors

The Instructor Companion Website

ISBN: 9781337554824

Is an all-in-one online resource for class preparation, presentation, and testing. Accessible through Cengage.com/login with your faculty account, you will find the following available for download:

- Book-specific Microsoft PowerPoint® slides of lecture outlines, as well as photos, figures, and tables from the text. These presentations make it easy for you to assemble lectures for your course.
- Cognero Test Bank (ISBN: 9781337554893): The Test Bank, offered in Microsoft Word and Cognero formats, contains multiple-choice and essay questions for each chapter. Cognero is a flexible, online system that allows you to author, edit, and manage test bank content for Hauss, *Comparative Politics*, 10th edition. Create multiple test versions instantly and deliver through your LMS from your classroom, or wherever you may be, with no special installs or downloads required.
- An **Instructor's Manual** includes the following material for each chapter: an outline and summary, critical thinking questions, in-class activities, lecture launching suggestions, a list of key terms with definitions, and suggested readings and Web resources.
- **Online versions** of the Canada, France, Japan, South Africa, and Brazil chapters.

Acknowledgments

Although I wrote every word of this book (other than the ones I took directly from someone else's writing), *Comparative Politics*, I could not have completed a book of this length or complexity on my own.

Normally, an author thanks his or her family members last. I will continue some of that tradition here as well.

However, I have to start with my wife, Gretchen Sandles. Gretchen is a first class political scientist in her own right who worked on the Soviet Union/Russia and Iran during her long and distinguished career as a foreign policy analyst for the American government. Not only did she keep me from making countless gaffes on those two countries in earlier editions, but she now spends a good bit of her time working with me at the Alliance for Peacebuilding (AfP). Her posting to the U.S. embassy in London in the late 1990s not only strengthened the UK chapter in this book but indirectly turned my work in peacebuilding from hobby into profession when I was asked to help lead a workshop on conflict resolution for young Palestinians in East Jerusalem.

I also have to thank the people who taught me. Many of them, including Roy Pierce, Chuck Tilly, J. D. Lewis, and Jere Bruner among others, are no longer with us. I am lucky to still learn from a few of my former professors, including Bob Putnam, Ken Sherrill, Bill Gamson, and Bob Hardgrave who makes a cameo appearance in the first few paragraphs of this book because he taught me my first course in comparative politics.

I've been lucky, too, to be able to learn from people I've co-taught courses in comparative politics, peacebuilding, and other topics with, including Guilain Denooux, Roger Bowen, the late Chris Allen, Joel Peters, and Doug Irvin-Erickson, not to mention Gretchen Sandles once again. I've also been fortunate to work with a number of leading comparative politics scholars. In addition to those mentioned earlier, I owe a lot to the late F. Lee Wilson, David Rayside, Steve Crowley, Chris Howell, and Peter Mandaville.

In the last few years, I've learned more than I ever imagined from my colleagues at AfP and the broader peacebuilding world. That starts with Melanie Greenberg, AfP's CEO who has the dubious honor of supervising my work. Just as important is Dick O'Neill who has been a friend since nursery school. We reconnected after our thirty-fifth high school reunion and discovered that a veteran peacenik (me) and a retired Navy Captain (Dick) shared common interests not just in peace but in complexity theory. I'm delighted that Dick has since joined the AfP board. Others in our world include Liz Hume, Stone Conroy, Craig Zelizer, Bob Berg, Peter Woodrow, Bernie Mayer, John Paul Lederach, Rob Ricigliano, Ravi Venkatsean, Sean Knierim, Steve Moseley, Chic Dambach, Shamil Idriss, Julia Roig, Guy and Heidi Burgess, and more.

On individual countries I had invaluable help from Peter Dixon, Joel Peters, and Philip Giddings (the United Kingdom), Roland Cayrol and Charles Tennenbaum (France), George Ross (European Union), Val Bunce and Sharon Wolchik (Russia), Ron Herring (India), TR Reid (the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States), and Ambassador John Campbell (Nigeria).

In my job as AfP's innovation officer, I've been fortunate to meet many of the non-political scientists I mention in the book. Part 5, in particular, could not have been written without the insights of Linton Wells, Robin Chase, Sam Arbesman, Nik Gowing, Chris Langdon, Helen Puig Larrauri, Rodrigo Davies, Bill Kramer, David Orr, and Charles Duhigg.

I was delighted, too, that Sarah Federman was able to work on the instructor's manual with me. Sarah is a good friend, veteran peacebuilder, and entrepreneur of the first order. She has probably done more to help me think about teaching in part because her own academic background does not include much political science. In particular, Sarah convinced me of the importance of including instructional videos on my website. When you visit www.charleshauss.info, you'll see just how much she outshines

me in terms of stage presence. Plus, she knows a lot about comparative politics to boot.

I also want to thank Kayla Tyler who turned my ideas for the website into reality. Gretchen and I met Kayla in a course on mass atrocity prevention we audited in Spring 2017 and realized she was a remarkable young woman who wants to build her own NGO that focuses on hand-made clothing made from recycled materials. For now, she works part-time for AfP in its Rewiring the Brain project that is exploring the links between neuroscience, peace-building, and spirituality. In her spare time, she is bringing me technologically into the twenty-first century.

Much of this book will be supplemented by online material at www.charleshauss.info. Alan Rosenbaltt, Amana Eamich Nguyen, and Shaun Dakin taught me everything I know about using social media and the web in general. Shaun and Amanda get double thanks because they survived the course with me at Colby College and George Mason University, respectively, and were still willing to talk with me.

As always, the team at Cengage made the production of this book (almost) easy. Brad Potthoff and Julia

Giannotti convinced me to do this tenth edition and helped make the whole process fun. Heather Thompson and her team helped create a wonderful and enjoyable marketing strategy. Corinna Dibble and Shannon Stanton shepherded the book through the production process.

As always, colleagues who reviewed the ninth edition had great ideas for the tenth, including

Joel I. Deichmann, Bentley University
 Alan Beck, Santa Fe College
 Edward Kwon, Northern Kentucky University
 Elizabeth Paddock, Drury University
 Jeanie Bukowski, Bradley University

Finally, back to my family. The book is dedicated to my grandchildren rather than their mother for reasons I explain in the final paragraphs of the book (so, do finish it). I stay active as a political scientist and as a peace-builder so that their adult lives just might be spent in a more just and peaceful world. If you are wondering why they have slightly different last names, ask someone who speaks a Slavic language.

To Kiril Petrovski and Mila Petrovska, grandchildren extraordinaire

CHAPTER 1
Global Challenges

CHAPTER 2
Domestic Responses

PART 1

Introduction



CHAPTER 1

Global Challenges



CHAPTER OUTLINE

A Not So Simple Exercise	4
From Global Challenges to Wicked Problems	6
Global Patterns/Global Challenges	12
Core Concepts in Comparative Politics	14
Where We Go from Here	17
Using This Book	18

Each of our actions has more unexpected ramifications than ever before, rippling not just to every corner of our infrastructure, but to every corner of the planet, and sometimes even beyond.

SAMUEL ARBESMAN

Welcome to the fascinating world of comparative politics.

I find it fascinating because comparative politics has helped me forge two very different careers: first as an academic and now as a professional peacebuilder and Washington political insider. In the former, I spent more than 40 years helping students see that studying political phenomena comparatively helped them understand any person, place, or event better than they would have if they had examined them on their own. It has helped me even more in my work as Senior Fellow for Innovation at the Alliance for Peacebuilding. There, I help my colleagues find general explanations for specific events and help them see the underlying causes of such phenomena as terrorism or the rise of populist leaders so that we develop effective strategies for dealing with groups that are as different as ISIS and the Trump administration.

Those years in the classroom also demonstrated to me that next to no one reading *Comparative Politics* will follow either of my career paths. You will, however, have at least one thing in common with me. We will all be citizens and, as such, you and I will be called on to make decisions about ISIS, the Trump administration, and other events or trends that we cannot even anticipate today.

Therefore, my most important goal is to help you make more informed choices as citizens by using the tools of comparative political analysis whether you take another course in political science or not. If, like Bob Hargrave, who taught me my first comparative politics course, I turn you on enough to major in political science or go into a professional field in which you use comparative politics, that would be like icing on the clichéd cake.

* * *

This book is based on a premise that holds in both of the worlds I work in, which is reflected in its subtitle—domestic responses to global challenges. You can't

understand politics inside a country without putting it in its global context and vice versa.

I will introduce domestic responses to global challenges in Part 1 in setting the stage for the rest of *Comparative Politics*, but I will do so in reverse order. As you will see in Chapter 2, introductory courses in comparative politics have traditionally focused on the behavior of **nation-states**. Understanding comparative politics today, however, forces us to start with the global challenges because they increasingly shape the issues that governments and their citizens have to deal with.

Therefore, I have resisted the temptation to dig right into the core concepts of comparative politics and focus first on the overall environment in which we comparativists do our work, whether as academics, activists, or average citizens. Specifically, that means starting with the ways **globalization**¹ has led to what I will call today's amazingly complicated **wicked problems**.

This book is also based on the assumption that we live during one of the most unsettled and unsettling periods in human history. Comparative politics alone will not help you come to grips with either globalization or wicked problems, but it can help. And, once we've seen the kinds of political insights it can lead to in Parts 2 through 4, we can then turn our attention to what it *can't* yet do in Part 5, which considers the future of comparative politics.

To see where I'm heading, consider the statement I used to begin this chapter and the one that I will use to begin the final one (yes, I am trying to convince you to actually get to the end of this book).

Each of our actions has more unexpected ramifications than ever before, rippling not just to every corner of our infrastructure, but to every corner of the planet, and sometimes even beyond.

As a species, we have never before stood at this moral fork in the road—where one of us could kill all of us and all of us could fix everything if we really decided to do so.

The first is by Sam Arbesman, a young and relatively unknown complexity scientist turned venture capitalist; the second is by the *New York Times* columnist, Thomas Friedman, who is arguably the world's best-known authority on globalization. Both are trying

¹Terms in bold can be found in the list of key terms at the end of each chapter and in the glossaries at the end of the book.

to understand dizzying changes that are sweeping our world. For now, it is enough to consider a phrase from each of them, which will begin setting the substantive agenda for *Comparative Politics*.

Arbesman draws our attention to the ways our actions ripple out to every corner of the planet. Everything we do—whether “we” refers to ourselves as citizens or our governments—at least indirectly affects everything and everyone else. Friedman raises two issues, which in his typically flamboyant style, he probably overstates a bit. We are, he states, at a moral fork in the road because of the massive powers we have amassed. He suggests that the stakes of political life are as high as they have ever been because we now have the capacity to destroy civilization (if not kill us all) or make major progress in dealing with the world’s wicked problems (if not fix them all).

A Not So Simple Exercise

The first few paragraphs of this book probably seem lofty and abstract if not politically idealistic and intellectually intimidating. That is the last impression I want to leave you with in starting this book.

The best way I know of bringing those ideas down to earth is to have you do an exercise I use in comparative politics classes and peacebuilding workshops that we can use in building the agenda for the rest of this book. You can do the exercise on your own. You will get more out of it if you do it with a few other people. They don’t have to be in your class.

However you do it, the instructions are simple enough. Get a big stack of sticky notes, sit either around a big table or a blank wall, go to the *New York Times* website (www.nytimes.com), and click on the “World” section on its home page.

Of the dozens of stories the *New York Times* covered that day, pick the four that you find most intriguing (it’s up to you to define what you mean by intriguing) and put a word or two about each one of them on a separate sticky note. If you did the exercise with other people, talk about why each of you chose your issues, and whittle the list down to the four you agree are the most important. If you did it on your own, you already have your list of topics. Whichever way you did the exercise, put your sticky notes on your tabletop or wall and leave as much space as you can between them.

Then, take a few minutes and think (or if you are a group, talk) about those issues. Don’t worry (yet) about whether you’re on target or not. Just develop as many

THINK ABOUT IT



Each chapter has a box like this one with questions to keep in mind while you are reading. Textbook authors usually put questions like these at the end of the chapter, which is what I did in most earlier editions of *Comparative Politics*. When placed at the end of the chapter, you can use them to make certain you’ve mastered the material after you’ve done the reading. Placing them here makes it easier for you to focus on a chapter’s difficult questions and concepts *while* you are reading it.

- Public opinion pollsters routinely ask if the people they interview think the country is heading in the “right direction” or is “on the wrong track.” If you were asked such a question about politics in the world today, how would you answer? Why did you reach that conclusion? This is an important enough question that you should ask it when you begin every chapter in the rest of this book.
- Much has changed since this book was finished in early 2017. In particular, do the assertions I make about global challenges and wicked problems still make sense? In what ways? Why (not)?
- You could interpret this chapter as arguing that it is becoming harder for governments to govern effectively. Do you agree? Why (not)?

plausible ideas about the issue as you can and jot each of them down on a single sticky note and put them up on your desktop or wall around the first ones you put up, which will now serve as the anchor points for the rest of the exercise. If you do the exercise with friends or classmates, you will almost certainly discover that you disagree with at least some of them on at least some of the issues. That’s fine, too, since almost everything about comparative politics is controversial, a point I will return to toward the end of this chapter.

Here are four of the stories the *Times* covered on February 23, 2017, which is the day I sent the manuscript to my editor at Cengage (though, as you will see, I was able to make some minor changes as the book made its way through the editorial process).

- The new—and to say the least controversial—U.S. president, **Donald Trump**, of course, could have filled the paper all by himself that morning. I was drawn to a story about the debate held the day before in the British **Parliament** about whether or not he should be

invited for an official state visit in which he would meet Queen Elizabeth II. The debate only took place because almost two million British citizens signed a petition that forced the issue onto the **House of Commons** agenda. This was by no means the most important issue Parliament faced in early 2017, but it does remind us how much of a lightning rod the new president can be.

- In part because of the controversies surrounding Russia's role in the election that brought Trump to power, the **European Union (EU)** has created an 11-member team, East Stratcom, to blunt the impact of fake news emanating from Moscow. The team was created in order to minimize the impact of Russian and other disinformation campaigns on elections in France, Germany, and other countries that would be taking place in the coming months.
- As many as 10,000 police officers attended rallies organized by members of the Uighur minority group in the remote western Chinese province of Xinjiang. The region has been the site of frequent protests in recent years, and Beijing was using the police presence to send the message that it would not allow the protests to go too far. The *New York Times* reporter also speculated that the **Chinese Communist Party's** new leader in Xinjiang was hoping to use the show of force to ease his way onto the all-power **Politburo** that makes all key political decisions for the entire country.
- UN officials issued an official warning about a famine in South Sudan that is endangering the lives of several million people in the world's newest country. Shortly after the country was born, a civil war had broken out between factions representing its two leading ethnic groups. Three years later, the country and its economy were in tatters. Malnutrition rates had reached record levels. No one dared guess how many people would die unless the fighting ended, aid poured in, and the economic infrastructure was rebuilt.

Journalists and comparative politics researchers do not do the same kind of work. Most journalists—Tom Friedman is an exception—believe that it is their job to report on what is happening. We comparativists, by contrast, want to go beyond the headlines and use events such as these as intellectual stepping stones that help reach general conclusions about broader phenomena.

My colleagues have developed plenty of sophisticated research tools that would help you do just that, some of which we will explore in Chapter 2. The rest of the exercise is designed to show you that you already know how

to do some rudimentary comparative analysis and some elementary **theory** building which, as you will see, is the goal of any scientific endeavor.

Of What Is This an Instance?

“Of what is this an instance” is one the most poorly worded question I've ever used. Its author, the late management theorist Chris Argyris, knew it and began each workshop by apologizing for the fact that he couldn't find a way of phrasing it better. He would then go on and use it anyway, because it helped people move up what he called the **ladder of abstraction** by going beyond the specific events in the news to what I just called broader phenomena.

To see why, consider my first example. As fascinated as I may be with Donald Trump, the comparativist in me is even more interested in what his meteoric rise to the presidency tells us about the emergence of populist leaders in all democratic countries in the last few years.

So, ask the Argyris question for each of your four issues. Jot each of the ideas you come up with down on its own sticky note, and arrange them on the desktop or wall around the one you used to identify and describe the issue.

What Are Its Causes?

In order to reach general conclusions about broader trends, comparativists try to develop general **theory** that help **explain** the kinds of events you decided to focus on. So, think or talk about what some of the key causes of the issues you picked. You will find some of them in the *New York Times* stories themselves. You will also probably come up some more with on your own.

Then, put each cause and consequence on one sticky note and put it next to the issues on your desktop or wall. Try to arrange them into clusters of what look like common kinds of causes and consequences. Again, don't worry whether you have the right clusters or not. You will have plenty of opportunities to sharpen your understandings of political phenomena later on.

How Does What Happens Over There Matter Over Here?

The next question may be the most important one because it will help you see why you should care about comparative politics. I borrowed it from a career army officer who knows next to nothing about academic political science. Colonel Christopher Holshek spent 30 years in the U.S. Army as a civil affairs officer, which meant he spent much of his career training enlisted men and women before they deployed to places like Bosnia, Liberia, and Iraq. Holshek wanted the soldiers under his command to

understand that what they did during their deployment would have an impact on what happened back at home.

Few readers of this book will ever join the military. Nonetheless, answering Christopher Holshek's question will be another critical step in mastering comparative politics and—far more importantly—making the course seem relevant to your personal life.

So, take the issues on your list and, if you are from the United States, think about why Americans should care about them. If you are not an American, do so for your home country. It may not be obvious in every case, but my guess is that you were drawn to issues that reflect what I'll soon call the entangled nature of the world's social and political issues and that it therefore is not hard to see how what happens “over there” affects your life “over here.”

Transfer your list of effects onto sticky notes as well, and put them on the desktop or wall, too.

Cleaning Up Your Wall

I obviously don't know what you have on your sticky notes. But, if you are like groups I have actually done this exercise with, your wall or desktop probably looks pretty messy. So, start moving the sticky notes around into clusters of similar causes and consequences. Once you do, you'll probably find that your clusters have versions of the six broad types of issues comparativists focus on the most, each of which we will explore more systematically later in this chapter and again in Chapter 2.


- Global forces that impinge on that country
- The social, economic, environmental, and other problems that gave rise to the problem in the first place
- Cultural norms and other values that reflect a country or region's history
- The press of public opinion in either the country as a whole or a subset of its population
- What members of the elite do whether they work through formal governmental institutions or not
- The official policies they enact and/or enforce

In other words, even if you had never heard the term comparative politics before you registered for this course, you can see that you already have a reasonable idea of what this field is all about.

You probably also at least came close to seeing the central contours of comparative politics, which I have outlined in Figure 1.1, which I will refer to so often in the course of this book that you should think of it as the first of three templates (I will introduce the other two in Chapter 2).

The realities of political life are obviously a lot more complicated than a diagram with three boxes and the same number of arrows can convey. However, Figure 1.1

FIGURE 1.1 State, Society, and Global Forces



focuses our attention on the two central questions that this book will explore. First, how do states and the citizens they govern make key decisions that shape peoples' lives? Second, how do global forces limit what *either* states or societies can hope to accomplish?

From Global Challenges to Wicked Problems

We will start with the first two of those six bullet points because they largely define what I meant by the term *global challenges* in this book's subtitle and therefore define the context in which comparativists work. Then, toward the end of this chapter and in the next one, we will get to the other four, which are at the heart of what comparativists actually study.

Globalization and Global Challenges

There is a simple reason why I use the phrase global challenges rather than globalization in the subtitle. When the first edition of this book was published in 1994, the word globalization was not widely used. It did exist. I used it from time to time but actually referred to interdependence more often in my teaching and writing. Therefore, my editors and I ended up deciding that global challenges was the best phrase to use when this book first came out. After that, inertia took over, and we have stuck with the original title.

Twenty years ago, including global challenges broke new ground because most comparative politics analysts did not pay much attention to their impact on domestic political life. There were signs that we could and should include them. In fact, many of us did in our teaching, especially those of us who taught both comparative politics and international relations courses.

At the time, I only decided to include global forces in any form because I was struggling to figure out how to merge what I was doing as a peacebuilder and policy maker with what I had done as a comparativist for the previous 20 years. Most of us now realize that the global challenges—or whatever you choose to call them—need to be in comparative politics courses because they go a long way toward defining both the research agenda of academic comparativists and the real-world issues that politicians and citizens alike have to cope with.

Part 5 will conclude this book by exploring how we may have to go even farther when I explore the idea of paradigm shifts and the next generation of comparative politics. For now, it is enough to see how globalization is making the lives of those of us who study comparative politics more interesting and, alas, more complicated.

Globalization, per se, is one of the most widely and loosely used terms in political life today. So, to be clear what I mean by it, let's start with the definition used by the Levin Institute of SUNY Albany, which runs a project that is appropriately named Globalization 101 (www.globalization101.org).

Globalization is a process of interaction and integration among the people, companies, and governments of different nations, a process driven by international trade and investment and aided by information technology. This process has effects on the environment, on culture, on political systems, on economic development and prosperity, and on human physical well being in societies around the world.

We will refer to each and every one of the issues the Levin Institute's scholars raise in the pages to come. But, even this definition does not point us in many useful and concrete directions for an introductory course. So, I find it useful to think about globalization in terms of two days, one year, and then four of its more specific features that have a direct bearing on comparative politics.

Two Dates and One Year

11/9

The first event occurred on November 9, 1989. The impossible happened. The Berlin Wall came down. To be precise, it was knocked down by jubilant protesters in both East and West Berlin. Once they had punched enough holes in it, people from both sides of the city streamed back and forth, ending decades of isolation.

We will explore why all that happened later. Here, it is enough to see that the Cold War that had defined global politics for almost half a century was over. True, it would take two more years before the Soviet Union

collapsed. Still, we knew we were entering a new world in which everything we took for granted was suddenly up for grabs.

9/11

The other key date is 9/11. As the cartoon on the next page suggests, the world changed at 8:45 that morning New York time when the first of two airplanes struck the World Trade Center. The day before, the continents seemed literally oceans apart. But by the time the second tower came down at 9:59, it felt like the continents literally sat right next to each other.

In that hour and 15 minutes, we learned Colonel Holshek's lesson firsthand, although we should have known it already. What happens over there matters over here. And, if we ever needed proof that globalization was happening, the attacks and their aftermath provided it.

There is also an intriguing symmetry in those two dates. Europeans put the month before the day, whereas Americans do the opposite. In other words, my 9/11 was Europeans' 11/9 and vice versa.

2007


On the day I wrote these lines, I shared a podium with Tom Friedman at a conference on wicked problems. He started his talk with Chapter 2 of his latest book, which bears the title, "What the Hell Happened in 2007."²

Friedman focuses on technology in that chapter in which he points out that the iPhone was introduced that January, which revolutionized the mobile phone industry. Amazon introduced the Kindle, which revolutionized the way millions of people read books, including me, since every book I read for this edition of *Comparative Politics* sits on my iPad, which is also my Kindle reader. Facebook became publicly available. IBM began work on its Watson computer that four years later defeated the two (human) Jeopardy grand champions. Twitter—introduced in 2006—really took off at the 2007 South by Southwest conference, which produced 60,000 tweets per day. Palantir started commercializing use of big data—a term next to no one had heard of in 2007.

It is fair to ask why events like these are so important for comparative politics and globalization. Two very different pieces of evidence should begin to make the case.

Right after my session with Friedman, I went to my grandson's house, got out my iPhone, and had a conversation with my grandson and son-in-law using Face Time. To begin with, no one had been able to combine video and telephones before that day in January 2007 when

²Thomas L. Friedman, *Thank You for Being Late: An Optimist's Guide to Living in an Age of Acceleration* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2016).



Steve Jobs introduced the iPhone. And by the way, my son-in-law was spending the week working in Chennai, India, when we spoke.

More directly relevant is the role that Facebook, Twitter, and other social media now play in political life. As early as 2009, protesters in Iran and their allies in the Iranian diaspora coordinated their actions using Facebook in the wave of demonstrations that took place after that year's presidential election. And, of course, there are those who argue that Donald Trump won the American presidency because of his masterful use of Twitter amid the accusations that he and his opponents used “fake news.”

VUCA

When I took my first comparative politics courses in the late 1960s, we didn't consider anything resembling global challenges. We only considered what happened inside a country's borders—in other words, we only studied the domestic responses, which amounted only to one-half of this book's subtitle.

In fact you could get a PhD in comparative politics in those days and never take a graduate level course in international relations. I know, because I did.

That chasm between comparative politics and international relations made little sense then. I was on your side of the professorial desk at the height of the Vietnam and Cold Wars after all.

But it makes even less sense today. You simply cannot understand politics in any country without putting it in its global context as I do with the left side of Figure 1.1. Similarly, you cannot understand global affairs without understanding what goes inside of nation-states. Thus, who wins a given election can make a huge difference as we saw with the Brexit and Trump victories in 2016.

Increasingly, globalization is disrupting conventional political life in ways we could not have imagined in 2000, let alone in my own student days. In trying to get academic and “real world” colleagues to see to the need to focus on the degree to which things have changed, I routinely use the acronym **VUCA** (Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous) as a shorthand term for describing those global forces which faculty members at the U.S. Army War College use in the courses they teach to the men and women who are on track to become army generals and senior civil servants.³

At least some of the issues you picked probably reflect the VUCAness of today's world. If not, you will encounter dozens of them in the rest of *Comparative Politics*.

³ Moisés Naím, *The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn't What It Used to Be* (New York: Basic Books, 2014).

Change Is the Only Constant

The phrase “change is the only constant” has been a staple of peacebuilding workshops for as long as I can remember. Few of us who use it, however, know that it was originally used by the Greek philosopher and historian Heraclitus in about 500 BC.

There is no way of knowing if his statement accurately described the Greece he lived in. I have no doubt, however, that it fits the world we live in today.

Before turning to political life, consider that statement in terms you are more likely to be familiar with—how information technology keeps changing our lives.

My parents got their first television when I was in the first grade—black and white of course. I can remember dialing a telephone and thinking twice before I made long distance calls because they were so expensive. I was a guinea pig when Oberlin College introduced computer programming as part of the introductory calculus curriculum in 1965.


I spent 20 years working with mainframe computers until I bought my first Mac after watching Apple’s legendary ad during the 1984 Super Bowl. I was amazed that a single little floppy disk that fit into that tiny box could store the equivalent of an entire book chapter! The desktop I use today is more than a thousand times faster and cost me less than a third of what I paid for that relic from a bygone technological age. My smartphone packs more computing power than the supercomputers that controlled the Apollo moon mission.

I am, of course, much older than most readers of this book, which will make your personal history of technological change different from mine. Whatever your age, you shouldn’t have much trouble making a list of once “hot” technologies that are now as laughingly obsolete as floppy disks, tape drives, and monochrome screens.⁴

Technology is just the tip of the iceberg. Everywhere we look, the pace of change is speeding up as depicted in Figure 1.2.

The idea depicted in that chart was the key finding of Alvin Toffler’s classic book, *Future Shock*, in which he estimated that people had invented more things in what he estimated to be humanity’s current, 800th lifetime than in all of prior history combined.⁵ When Toffler and his wife updated their research a decade later, the number of inventions had doubled again and has continued to double again

FIGURE 1.2 New Innovations over Time



over shorter and shorter bursts of time, yielding something like this curve.

Today, those kinds of findings are normally referred to as a version of **Moore’s law**, named for Gordon Moore who was one of Intel’s cofounders. A few years before Toffler wrote, Moore predicted (accurately at least so far) that the speed of microprocessors would double and their price would be cut in half every two years or less.

As we will see time and time again in the pages that follow, the rate of change in dozens of parts of our lives follows that kind of **exponential growth**. Any time we encounter an accelerating or exponential curve of any sort, it includes a point at which growth suddenly seems to take off. This, of course, is what Malcolm Gladwell had in mind when he made the term tipping point famous.⁶ As Friedman sees it, the upward slope of change is often so pronounced that Figure 1.2 ends up looking more like a hockey stick which is what scientific graphs about climate change often look like.

I raise exponential rates of growth here because they tend to leave political disruption and VUCAness in their wake. In policy area after policy area, we have seen problems seemingly spin out of control, many of which you already discussed in the *New York Times* exercise.

As the then president of the Rockefeller Foundation Judith Rodin points out in her remarkable book on the resilience dividend:

Sometimes a disruption becomes a disaster. The disruptive event escalates into a crisis of great proportion, catalyzes other problems, cascades across domains and scales, spins things out of control, and disturbs human activity to an abnormal,

⁴If you need convincing, watch this video in the “Kids React” series: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PF7EpEnglGk&index=2&list=PLFCAA1C9F5755B266>.

⁵Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (New York: Random House, 1970).

⁶Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference* (New York: Little Brown, 2000).